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Abstract. The purpose of this article is to revisit the basic model of labour supply taking into 
account the existence of corruption in public administrations in developing countries. The 
worker-consumer programme modified by the integration of bribery shows that at 
equilibrium, the optimal solution leads to a Marginal Rate of Substitution of leisure 
consumption equal to the real contractual wage rate plus the actual bribe rate. Because of 
the latter, the reserve wage is no longer an essential determinant for participating in the 
labour market. Corruption seems to amplify the substitution and income effects. 
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1. Introduction 
n the allocation of time between work and leisure, it is assumed that 
goods purchased on the market are, like leisure, a direct source of 
utility. The consumption of a combination of goods and leisure under 
budgetary constraints enables the individual to achieve optimal utility. 
Criticism of this allocation of time has always focused on the time allocated 
to leisure. In this perspective, Mincer (1962) states that the distribution of 
time is not limited to a simple choice between work and leisure. The latter 
includes time spent on household production, particularly in the case of 
women. Household chores should therefore be distinguished from leisure. 
However, this distinction disappears in the more general formulation by 
Becker (Gronau, 1997) who, starting from the idea that leisure time does not 
in itself produce utility, thinks that goods are combined with leisure for the 
purpose of obtaining household goods. 
Goods bought at the market are no longer a direct source of utility as in 
the work / leisure dichotomy, but rather, a factor of household production 
(Gronau, 1986). Concerning the household, Bourguignon (1984), Leuthold 
(1968) and Chiappori (1992) take into account the fact that each individual 
is immersed in a social context which affects his preferences and his 
modalities in decision making. 
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In this regard, the work / leisure dichotomy pattern is enriched when we 
take into account the influence of family preferences. The choice analysis in 
the household is based on two approaches: the first assumes that individual 
preferences are transcended by those of the family (Gronau, 1977; Graham 
& Green, 1984). The satisfaction derived from the consumption of goods 
depends only on its total amount and not on the way in which it is 
distributed between individuals.  
The second approach assumes that individuals have different 
preferences and make their decisions, either in isolation or through 
negotiation (Chiappori, 1988 and 1992). In any case, it appears that even 
when the neoclassical theory of labour supply takes into account the 
possibilities of domestic production and collective modalities, it turns out 
to be less satisfactory because it neglects the working time allocated to 
corruption in the public administrations of developing countries1. On the 
one hand, we can define corrupt working time as the time during which an 
employee uses part of his contractual working time on his own account; 
and on the other hand the contractual (or legal) working time is understood 
as the working time stated in the contract which binds the employee to his 
employer, namely the State, in this case. From the above, it emerges that in 
the neoclassical theory of time allocation, the consumption of leisure – even 
if this term also includes household production –is the only alternative to 
wage contract work; there is no room for corrupt work. 
The dual problem raised here is the following: how does an individual 
allocate his limited time between corrupt work, contract work and leisure? 
And, on the other hand, to what extent can this allocation of timeenable 
him to remain in balance when a change in contractual salary occurs? 
This study seems relevant insofar as it deepens the analysis of time 
allocation by offering a new light on the behaviour of the individual 
employee. It differs from previous work (Mincer, 1962; Becker, 1965) by the 
fact that it takes bribery into account in the allocation of time. The basic 
hypothesis is that corrupt labour can be partially or totally substituted for 
contract labour. 
We will find that at equilibrium the marginal rate of substitution of 
leisure consumption is equal to the sum of the real contractual wage rate 
and the real bribery rate. Therefore, the decrease in the actual contractual 
salary can be offset by the increase in the bribery rate, thereby making it 
possible for the employee to remain in balance. In section 2, we will 
introduce the model. Section 3 discusses the limitations of the model and 





1 Corruption is rampant in most public administrations in developing countries. See on this 
subject Cartier-Bresson (1992, 1998, 2000). Corruption does not plague the public 
administrations of these countries alone. However, the occurrence of this scourge is 
relatively high in comparison with the so-called developed countries. 
Turkish Economic Review 
S.M. Bikoue, TER, 7(3), 2020, p.151-163. 
153 
153 
2.  The model 
The presentation of this model is based on hypotheses and the 
resolution of the worker's programme. 
 
2.1. The hypotheses of the model  
Five hypotheses (H1, H2, H3, H4, H5) underlie the model: 
H1: Contractual or legal labour (ℎℓ) and corrupt labour (hc) are substitutes 
and/or complements 
The hypothesis is likely if the official has some discretionary power 
which enables him, when in a monopoly position, to reduce the supply of 
public services. He does this either by refusing to serve users normally, or 
by making them wait for a long time, thereby lengthening the duration of 
users in the queue. The user, bribe-giver, will shorten his time in the queue 
(Lui, 1985). In this way, the civil servant will compensate for a reduction in 
his legal working time by an increase in his corrupt working time and vice 
versa. 
H2: The public sector labour market is transparent, and corruption is observable 
This hypothesis is valid in a situation where an atomistic labour supply 
faces numerous bribe-givers so that the market for corruption becomes 
very competitive (Cartier-Bresson, 1998). The hypothesis also holds in a 
world where it is difficult to distinguish between bribe and tax as it was the 
case in the Philippines of Marcos or Zaire of Mobutu (Schleifer & Vishny, 
1993). 
However, given the illegal and reprehensible nature of corruption, it is 
generally kept secret (Schleifer & Vishny, 1993). 
H3: Unions of civil-service workers depend on political power 
The mode of expression widely used by unionists in order to establish 
the equality of relationships they have always fought for with employers is 
their capacity to go on strike, and therefore to disrupt work. This mode of 
expression is all the more virulent since the reason for the strike is the fall 
in nominal or real wages. 
However, we assume that in nations where corruption is rampant, trade 
unions are subservient to the ruling party. So, the independence of these 
unions is artificial and even illusory. It would therefore not be surprising to 
see that these unions do not go on strike when there is a drastic drop in 
wages, a decrease which is to be offset by "bribing" public services. 
H4: Legal work (ℎℓ) and corrupt work (hc) are homogeneous. Therefore, the legal 
(𝑊ℓ) and corrupt (Wc) wage rates are unique. 
This hypothesis reflects the fact that on each respective legal or corrupt 
labour market, civil servants sell perfectly identical job qualifications. 
Therefore, the consideration is also the same. There is no difference 
between the qualifications sold; so, the buyers (the State for legal work, and 
individual users for corrupt labour) are completely indifferent as concerns 
the seller’s identity. 
The hypothesis is nevertheless reductive in reality, the work of a medical 
doctor cannot be identified with that of the nurse, just as the work of a 
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university professor cannot be compared to the work of a primary school 
teacher, etc. The observable reality rather accounts for the heterogeneity of 
work. However, the hypothesis holds because it enables to simplify the 
complexity of the labour market reality. 
H5: The civil-servant maximizes his objective-function under the constraint of 
his budget 
The hypothesis expresses the rationality of the civil servant considered 
as a worker-consumer. As a result, his equilibrium as a consumer becomes 
his equilibrium as a provider of producer services. Its budgetary constraint 
equalizes the value (PC)2 of the products he buys and that of the services he 
sells to his employer (contractual work) and to users (corrupt work), and its 
objective-function integrates, alongside the utility (C) of the former, 
"disutility" (h = ℎ𝓵+ hc)3 of the latter. 
 
2.2. The worker’s programme  
The consumption / leisure dichotomy is represented using a utility 
function specific to each individual, namely U (C, L), where C and L 
respectively denote the consumption of goods and that of leisure. 
Assuming that an individual has a total endowed time Lo, the working 
time, expressed in hours for example, is then given by h = Lo – L. This 
working time h can be broken down into legal and contractual working 
time (ℎℓ) and corrupt working time (hc), i.e. h = ℎℓ + hc. 
It is generally assumed that an individual wishes to consume as much 
goods and leisure as possible, so his utility function increases with his two 
arguments, namely C and L. Moreover, this individual is likely to reach the 
same level of satisfaction with a lot of leisure and few goods, or little leisure 
and a lot of goods. 
 Choices 
If we denote by wthe real hourly wage (the price of consumer goods C is 
normalized to 1), wage income amounts to w.h. 
These real hourly wageswcan be broken down into real legal and 
contractual hourly wages (we) and real corruption hourly wages (wc), i.e.w = 
𝑤ℓ+ wc.Consequently, salary income will correspond to 𝑤ℓ.ℎℓ+wc.hc. 
The single wagesR represents all non-wage resources expressed in real 
terms. 
The agent's budgetary constraint is expressed as follows: 
 
𝐶 ≤ 𝑤ℎ + 𝑅         (1) 
 
This constraint can also be written as follows: 
 
𝐶 + 𝑤𝐿 ≤ 𝑅0 ≡ 𝑤𝐿0 + 𝑅       (2) 
 
 
2 P denotes the general price level and C a product representative of a set of products 
3 The disutility of work t implies an effort and a sacrifice of leisure time 
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It is as if the agent has a potential income Roobtained by devoting all of 
his endowedtime to work, and that he purchases leisure and consumer 
goods using this income. The consumption programme consists in 
choosing a couple (C, L), respecting the budget constraint and maximizing 
its utility U(C, L), i.e.: 
 
Max 𝑈 (𝐶, 𝐿)         (3) 
SC: 𝐶 + 𝑤𝐿 ≤ 𝑅 0 ≡ 𝑤𝐿0 + 𝑅  
 
The optimal solution (represented on figure 1) known as “interior”, i.e. 
such as 0  <  L < L0 et C > 0, is located at the point of tangency E between 
the budget line AB, of slope w, i.e. 𝑤ℓ+ wc, and an indifference curve (set of 
couples (C, L) for which the consumer obtains the same level of utility 𝑢 , 
such that U (C, L) =𝑢 ). 
   Thus, the optimal interior solution (C*, L*) is completely defined by 
the two equalities: 
 
𝑈𝐿 𝐶
∗,   𝐿∗ 
𝑈𝑐 𝐶
∗,𝐿∗ 
= 𝑤 = 𝑤ℓ + 𝑤𝑐  and C* + wL* = R0     (4) 
 
This optimal solution specifies that the marginal rate of substitution 
between consumption and leisure,  
𝑈𝐿
𝑈𝑐
 is equal to the real hourly wages, that 
is to say the sum of the real hourly legal and contractual wages (𝑤ℓ) and the 
real hourly corruption wages (wc). 
 
Figure 1. The consumption – leisure arbitrage 
 
 The Reserve wage 
For relation (A) to effectively describe the optimal solution to the 
consumer problem, point E must be located to the left of point A, otherwise 
the labour supply is zero (L = Lo). However, the convexity of the 
indifference curves implies that the marginal rate of substitution between 
consumption and leisure, i.e. 
𝑈𝐿
𝑈𝑐
, decreases when we move to the right on 
𝑤ℓ< 
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an indifference curve. As this marginal rate of substitution also represents 
the slope of the tangent to an indifference curve, an agent offers a strictly 
positive number of hours if the marginal rate of substitution at point A is 
less than the current legal contractual wage𝑤ℓ. However, the employee 
does not only earn 𝑤ℓ.he also receives wc. As a result, the employee actually 
earns two wages, one is contractual 𝑤ℓ and the other is from corruption wc. 
The marginal rate of substitution at point A is called the reserve wage 





            (5) 
 
According to the basic model of labour supply, assuming that the 
endowed time Lo denotes an invariable physical quantity, the salary 
depends only on the shape of the function U at point A of the non-wage 
income value R. The reserve wages wA determines the conditions for 
participating in the labour market. If the legal current wages 𝑤ℓ are lower, 
the agent does not offer working hours, it is said that he does not 
participate in the labour market. We can show that if leisure is a normal 
good (i.e. a good whose consumption increases with income), an increase in 
non-wage income R increases the reserve wages and therefore has a 
disincentive effect on entry into the labour market. 
The basic model only takes bribery into account on the labour market. In 
such a context, the wages wA will no longer determine the conditions for 
participating in the labour market, because even this salary may be lower 
than the legal current wages 𝑤ℓ and the agent will nevertheless participate 
in the labour market thanks to bribery on this market where besides 
winning 𝑤ℓ, he will also win wc, wages from bribery, i.e. finally 𝑤ℓ + wc. 
If leisure is a normal good, an increase in non-wage income r increases 
the reserve salary without disincentive effect on the labour market because 
of the expected gains wc. The occurrence of corruption in the labour market 
therefore calls into question the labour market and the basic model of 
labour supply. Reserve wages are no longer an essential determinant of 
market participation conditions. We can therefore summarize the 





< 𝑤ℓ           (6) 
 
the agent participates in the labour market (basic model of labour 
supply) 
 
𝑤𝐴 > 𝑤ℓ       (7) 
 
the agent participates in the labour market (basic model of labour 
supply revised with hope of gaining from bribery in the labour markets). 
 
𝑤𝐴 =  𝑤ℓ       (8) 
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the agent is indifferent whether or not to participate in the labour 
market. He may also not be indifferent and participate if there are expected 
wages from bribery 
 
𝑤𝐴  =  𝑤ℓ +  𝑤ℓ      (9) 
 
the agent is indifferent to participate or not in the labour market 
 
𝑤𝐴 < 𝑤ℓ +  𝑤𝑐        (10) 
 
the agent participates in the labour market (basic model revised with 
certain gains from bribery on the labour market) 
 
𝑤𝐴 > 𝑤ℓ +  𝑤𝑐        (11) 
 
non-participation in the labour market despite the assurance of wages 
from bribery in this market. 
 
2.3. From theory to estimation 
The relation (4) shows that the labour supply h* = L0 - L* depends on the 
wages w(4)=  𝑤ℓ + wc, non-wage income R and preferences specific to the 
individual considered. This link is the basic equation for estimating the 
empirical model. Many studies have been devoted to this problem (see 
Blundell & MaCurdy, 1999). A characteristic form of this basic equation is 
written as follows: 
 
log ℎ = ∝𝑤 log 𝑤 + ∝𝑅 log 𝑅 + 𝑥. 𝜃 + 𝜀 
 
In this expression, log represents the natural logarithm; h denotes the 
hours worked that we break down into ℎℓ  contractual and legal working 
hours and hcworking hours devoted to corruption, in other words h =ℎℓ + 
hc ; wthe net hourly wages which we also break down into 𝑤ℓ the legal 
contractual hourly wages and wc the salary of corruption, in other words w 
=𝑤ℓ + wc ; R is a measure of income other than current wages; x is a vector 
describing the individual characteristics or the control variables chosen. 
The coefficients 𝜃, ∝𝑤  (avec ∝𝑤  = ∝𝑤ℓ+ ∝𝑤𝑐 ), et ∝𝑅  are parameters to be 
estimated, while que h, w, R and xare observed. Finally,𝜀 denotes a random 
term reflecting the individual heterogeneity not observed. 
The use of logarithms makes it possible to interpret the coefficients 
∝𝑤 and ∝𝑤𝑅  as the wage elasticity and the income elasticity of labour 
supply. 
 
2.4. Reserve salary and activity rate 
A particularly important case is when, given our preferences, our 
earning potential in the labour market and the magnitude of our non-wage 
 
4 Empirical models assume that w =  𝑤ℓ . Here we consider that w =  𝑤ℓ + wc.  
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income, we decide to offer no hours of work. In this case, the labour supply 
is zero. We then enter the category of inactive population and say that we 
do not participate in the labour market. Conversely, if we decide to offer a 
positive quantity of work, we participate in the labour market and we are 
qualified as active. The basic model of labour supply assumes that a person 
is less motivated to participate in the labour market when his non-wage 
income is important and that the wage which he can claim is low. 
According to this model, for any salary proposal lower than our reserve 
salary, we prefer to allocate all of our available time to leisure rather than 
working even an hour. There is a limit to the basic model here. Indeed, as 
mentioned above, a proposal for a salary lower than the reserve salary 
gives rise to participation in the labour market when bribery affects this 
market. The worker participates in the labour market even if the salary 
proposal is lower than his reserve salary because he hopes (or rather is 
certain) to obtain substantial additional income at his workplace due to 
corruption which most often are higher than his initial salary proposal. 
For a given working-age population, the proportion of those who 
participate in the labour market is called the activity rate (relating to the 
population considered). As a rule, the reserve salary increases with non-
salary income. Consequently, any measure aimed at reducing these 
incomes and / or increasing net wages without taxes has a positive effect on 
the desire to participate in the labour market and must increase the 
participation rate. This principle and its consequence must be qualified. 
Indeed, the desire to participate in the market can be independent of 
variations in non-wage income (and therefore the reserve salary) and in net 
wages without taxes. This desire to participate in the market will depend 
more on the corruption opportunities in this market. This means that 
regardless of the reserve wage level, an individual can participate in the 
market, as long as he hopes (or rather is certain) to have bribes at his 
workplace. 
 
2.5. Substitution effect and income effect 
Having decided to participate in the job market, how many hours will 
we work? According to the basic model, it depends on the difference 
between the hourly wage offered (legal contractual hourly wage) and our 
reserve salary. As an illustration, suppose that the proposed salary begins 
by being equal to the reserve salary and then increases indefinitely from 
this value. By definition when the proposed salary increases from this level 
of the reserve salary, the labour supply goes from a zero value to a positive 
value. There is a substitution effect which makes us replace a little leisure 
with an equal amount of work. 
There is at least a limit of the basic model in the demonstration of this 
substitution effect. 
Indeed, having decided to participate in the labour market, the number 
of working hours will not depend only on the difference between the 
hourly wage offered (𝑤ℓ ) and our reserve salary (wA). In a labour market 
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that is largely open to corruption, this difference will depend on the sum of 
the legal salary (𝑤ℓ plus the salary for corrupt practices (wc) and the reserve 
salary (wA). Thus, by definition of the reserve salary, the proposed salary 
(𝑤ℓ ) may not increase at this level, the labour supply will go from a zero 
value to a positive value due to taking into account the salary for hours of 
corruption (wc). There is a substitution effect which makes us replace a little 
leisure with an amount equal to the sum of the contractual legal labour (ℎℓ) 
and the corrupt labour (hc). 
But, whatever the volume of working hours (ℎℓ and/or hc), any increase 
in wages (𝑤ℓ  and/or wc) for this same volume increases our income. If 
leisure is a “normal” good – which means that its consumption increases 
with wealth (empirical studies tend to prove that this is the case for the vast 
majority of individuals) – this increase in income is accompanied by a 
desire to take more leisure time and, therefore, a desire to work less. 
This phenomenon is called the income effect, and obviously it opposes 
the substitution effect. 
According to the basic model, as long as the proposed wage (𝑤ℓ) is not 
too large compared to the reserve wage (wA), the substitution effect 
dominates the income effect and the supply of labour increases with the 
hourly wage (𝑤ℓ).  But it is possible that from a certain value of the latter, 
the income effect dominates the substitution effect. The labour supply then 
decreases with the proposed hourly wage (𝑤ℓ). 
One can also note here one of the limits of the prediction of the basic 
model. Indeed, the proposed salary (𝑤ℓ) may be lower than the reserve 
salary (wA) but so far the substitution effect will dominate the income effect 
due to the salary for hours of corruption (wc) and labour supply will 
increase with the sum of legal (𝑤ℓ) and corrupt (wc) wages. But it is also 
likely that from a certain value on this sum of wages (𝑤ℓ +wc), the income 
effect dominates the substitution effect. 
The labour supply will no longer decrease only with the proposed 
hourly wage (wl) but rather with the sum of the contractual (wl) and corrupt 
(wc) wages. 
 
3. Limits of the model 
3.1. The presence of independent unions can prevent the 
compensation / complementarity between wc  and wℓ  
It is acknowledged that one of themajor concerns of a trade union that is 
independent (of political power) is to obtain wages if not satisfactory, at 
least as high as possible. Unions can thus try to obtain direct wage 
increases by negotiating with employers, under the real or latent threatof 
strike. 
The idea of a nominal or real wage cut is therefore not admissible for a 
union which can independently use legal means, notably the right to strike, 
to oppose this cut. 
The famous controversy between Dunlop & Ross of (1944 and 1948) 
concerns the objectives and ultimately the nature of the union seen from a 
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standpoint where wages are privileged. To the thesis developed by Dunlop 
(1944) in his work: Wage Determination under Trade Unions, The Mac 
Millan Company 1944, responded with the thesis defended by Ross (1948) 
on: Trade Union Wage policies, University of California Press, 1948. 
The position of Dunlop (1944) is simple; the union, which cares about 
the interests of its members, seeks not to obtain the maximum salary, which 
could be to the detriment of the number of people hired among its 
members, but the total income that all of them can achieve. Consequently, 
unions’ actions in favor of high wages cannot be separated from positions 
taken in favor of employment, and more generally the wage policy of a 
union depends on the link between wages and a set of variables which 
affect production and employment: costs, product prices, profits perceived 
by employers. In this conception, the union is conceived as an economic 
agent. 
Ross's (1948) position is opposite. In a famous formula, this author 
affirms that "the union is a political agency operating in an economic 
environment", whose leaders have as primary objective its survival and 
growth. We cannot therefore specify in advance the union’s choices in 
terms of wages, it is first necessary to establish the decision-making process 
internal to the organization, which results from a quadruple confrontation 
of the leaders with the base, the employers, the government and other 
union leaders. 
For Ross (1944), the maximization of an income cannot constitute the 
aim of the union, firstly because its purpose is political, secondly because 
the orientation of the wage policy will prove to be unstable, and in any case 
less sensitive to employment calculations. 
However, a compromise has been found between these two conceptions, 
by authors such as Lester, Myers & Reynolds (1980). It consists in agreeing 
with Ross (1944) for the beginning and the general framework of the 
argument, and with Dunlop (1948) for the end. The tension between an 
economic logic and a political logic in the narrow sense does not disappear, 
it is seen as internal to the union. 
 
3.2. In reality, the job market is heterogeneous. Consequently, 
there are several wage rates (𝑤ℓ) and bribes (wc). 
The heterogeneity of the work makes one think of the multiplicity of 
wage rates (high, low, average, etc.) and not of the uniqueness of these 
rates. 
Starting from the idea that wage cuts are not the same when moving 
from one group of employees to another. For example, consider two salary 
groups, one well paid, and the other poorly paid. If the latter endures a 
drop of 20% while the former faces acut of 5%, the expected reactions of the 
2 groups as concerns bribes in order to compensate for the drop in wages 
will be different. 
To preserve their purchasing power, the poorly paid group will tend to 
receive more bribes than the other group. In general, it can be noticed that 
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the drop in salaries in the public service hardly affects (or does not affect at 
all)some professions, namely the army, the police and the gendarmerie 
who ensure social security or help maintain the ruling party in office. 
However, in the countries where the laws are flouted, the sanctions 
absent, even these professions are engaged in bribery although their wages 
are relatively high. At this level there are grounds for thinking that 
individuals accept bribes not in order to compensate for lower wages, but 
simply out of financial greed. Tanzi (2000) will speak of corruption for 
necessity in the first and corruption for greed in the second. 
 
3.3. The corruption market is opaque and corruption in particular 
is hardly visible 
The compensation between wC and wL may not work when corruption is 
unobservable. We can then imagine an electronic detection system placed 
in each service (like the practices prevailing in modern supermarkets) 
allowing a central control to identify acts of corruption in the workplace. 
One can also control bribery by teaming up corrupt supervisors with 
honest officials. 
However, these forms of control would only be justified if the marginal 
costs of eliminating corruption do not exceed the marginal benefits 
expected from the phenomenon (Becker, 1968; Becker & Stigler, 1974; 
Banfield, 1975). From another point of view, control can prove to be 
ineffective if civil servants develop survival strategies in the event of a 
drastic wL decline, which in reality results in the perception of bribes 
(Ackerman, 1998). 
Furthermore, despite the unobservable nature of corruption, control can 
prove to be ineffective if the controllers are themselves corruptible with, as 
a corollary, the establishment of forms of collusion between controllers - 
officials - hierarchy. In general, if the attitude of the disciplinary or justice 
council is characterized by corruption, four scenarios are possible: 
1st case: The disciplinary council or the justice system ransoms the user 
and not the corrupt official. The latter is punished (fine, imprisonment, 
etc.). 
2nd case: The disciplinary or justice council ransoms the corrupt official 
and not the user. There is no sanction. 
3rd case: The disciplinary council or the justice system ransoms both the 
corrupt official and the user. The counselor asks them to agree to an 
amicable settlement. There is no sanction. 
4th case: The corrupt official gives a very large ransom to justice. Justice 
asks the user not to continue the trial although he is obviously right. In 
return, the justice system can take part of the ransom obtained from the 
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Taking bribery into account changes the job supplier's programme of the 
basic model. Indeed, at the optimum, the marginal rate of substitution 
between consumption and leisure is no longer equal to the only legal 
hourly real wage (𝑤ℓ) but rather to the latter increased by the corrupt 
hourly real wage (𝑤𝑐) . In addition, the reserve wage (𝑤𝐴) no longer 
appears to be the only determinant of participation in the labour market, 
corruption plays an equally important role. 
The substitution effect no longer replaces a bit of leisure only with a 
quantity of legal work (ℎℓ)but also with a quantity of corrupt work (ℎ𝑐). 
The desire to take more leisure time and, consequently, the desire to work 
less – the income effect –can no longer be ascribed to the mere increase in 
the statutory salary but also to an increase in bribery. 
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